Alberto López Ortega

Can a second far-right party succeed in a country where the radical right was, until recently, absent? Spain’s 2024 European Parliament elections provided a striking answer with the emergence of SALF (“Let the Party Be Over”), a far-right anti-politics platform that captured 4.6% of the vote in its electoral debut, outperforming Podemos and the major regional parties. Through a comprehensive analysis of individual-level data from approximately 38,000 respondents across eleven surveys, we provide the first systematic assessment of SALF’s voters and compare them to other Spanish constituencies. First, our findings reveal an intriguing paradox: while SALF voters self-identify as more centrist than supporters of VOX (Spain’s main far-right party), their positions on substantive policies are similarly extreme. In contrast, SALF’s success stems from a distinctive combination of dissatisfaction with democracy and nontraditional media consumption patterns, especially among young male voters. Notably, while VOX’s earlier rise was primarily driven by Spain’s territorial tensions, SALF’s emergence signals a deeper phenomenon: profound disillusionment with Spain’s political system among specific segments of society.

Are radical right supporters penalized by a social norm against the radical right on the dating market? This paper investigates this question by leveraging diverse empirical sources, including a unique and behavioral visual conjoint experiment conducted in Britain and Spain. Theoretically, we argue that the radical right is accommodated within the dating market as a result of the affective spillovers among those on the center-right who view dating those from the opposing ideological bloc as more socially costly than dating their own in-bloc partners. Empirically, we test this by examining the behavior of center-right partisans and assessing whether they follow a polity-based norm which places a premium on ostracizing stigmatized parties, or a bloc-logic norm which incentivizes the rejection of out-bloc partisans. The results demonstrate that center-right partisans accommodate the radical right and are actively expected to do so by fellow in-group partisans. Any dating market penalty for radical right partisans is based on the composition of those on the dating market rather than any polity-level norm enforcement. An accommodating bloc-logic in dating preferences among the mainstream right has large normative implications as it suggests that affective polarization and out-bloc rejection between overarching political camps contributes to facilitating the social normalization of radical right supporters who often hold preferences incompatible with liberal democracy.

Does learning political candidates’ social categories through visual cues affect voter preferences? This paper explores this question by conducting a visual conjoint survey experiment with 2,324 German voters, varying whether respondents received information on candidates through explicit labels or pretested AI-generated candidate pictures. The results confirm our expectations that the way in which social categories are perceived affects preferences, with visual cues having a more significant effect on voter preferences compared to textual cues, leading to more discriminatory preferences for certain social categories. Moreover, we show that the effect of visual cues is moderated by the visibility of social categories, with visible social categories, such as gender binaries and ethnic in-/out-group, eliciting more discriminatory preferences with visual cues. The study sheds light on how visible and invisible social categories affect political candidates’ preferences and emphasizes the importance of considering the intersectionality of social categories and their relationship with ideology.

Does learning political candidates’ social categories through visual cues affect voter preferences? This paper explores this question by conducting a visual conjoint survey experiment with 2,324 German voters, varying whether respondents received information on candidates through explicit labels or pretested AI-generated candidate pictures. The results confirm our expectations that the way in which social categories are perceived affects preferences, with visual cues having a more significant effect on voter preferences compared to textual cues, leading to more discriminatory preferences for certain social categories. Moreover, we show that the effect of visual cues is moderated by the visibility of social categories, with visible social categories, such as gender binaries and ethnic in-/out-group, eliciting more discriminatory preferences with visual cues. The study sheds light on how visible and invisible social categories affect political candidates’ preferences and emphasizes the importance of considering the intersectionality of social categories and their relationship with ideology.

Can nativist attitudes condition support for LGBT+ rights? The sustained advance in pro-LGBT+ attitudes in the West often contrasts with the greening of anti-immigrant sentiment propagated by nativist supply-side actors. We argue that these parallel trends are causally connected, theorizing that exposure to sexually conservative ethnic out-groups can provoke an instrumental increase in LGBT+ inclusion, particularly among those hostile toward immigration. Leveraging experiments in Britain and Spain, we provide causal evidence that citizens strategically liberalize their levels of support for LGBT+ rights when opponents of these measures are from the ethnic out-group. In a context where sexuality-based liberalism is nationalized, increasing tolerance toward LGBT+ citizens is driven by a desire among nativist citizens to socially disidentify from those out-groups perceived as inimical to these nationalized norms. Our analyses provide a critical interpretation of positive trends in LGBT+ tolerance with instrumental liberalism masking lower rates of genuine shifts in LGBT+ inclusion.